


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
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2. Rhee apparently determined to sabotage political conference:



Ambassador Briggs believes that President Rhee has made up his mind to sabotage a Korean political conference unless the United

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States assures him it will resume the fighting if the conference fails to achieve withdrawal of the Chinese Communists from Korea after 90 days. Rhee implied, however, that he might settle for a promise of logistic and materiel support if the United States were unwilling to fight.

Briggs believes Rhee is motivated by a deep-rooted suspicion of attempts to secure unification through negotiations, a belief that the Communists have no intention of relinquishing North Korea, and concern over increasing Chinese influence there. Rhee apparently believes that the talks would merely give the Chinese time to consolidate in North Korea.


Comment: On his return on 29 November from talks with Chinese leaders in Taipei, Rhee repudiated an agreement made three days before to invite nonvoting observers to the conference.

3. Reactivation of two North Korean corps indicated:

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Agency
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Analysis of addresses on messages since mid-September from Supreme Headquarters in Pyongyang to units believed of corps level suggests that the North Korean VI and VIII Corps have been reactivated.

Comment: The reactivation of these two corps, which were accepted as deactivated in 1952, would make a total of eight corps and possibly 24 divisions in the North Korean army. North Korean divisions normally have a strength of 11,000 but presently are believed to have about 9,200 men.



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